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This article analyses support for censorship in Russia as part of the democratization 
process. Censorship has been an important part of Russian history and it was strengthened 
during the Soviet era. After the collapse of the Soviet system formal censorship was banned 
even though the reality has been different. Therefore it is not strange that many Russians 
would like to limit the freedom of the media and to censor certain topics. The views of 
Russians on censorship have been studied on the basis of a survey carried out in 2007. 
According to the results, three different dimensions of censorship were found. These 
dimensions include moral censorship, political censorship, and censorship of religious 
materials. Support for these dimensions varies on the basis of socio-demographic 
characteristics and media use. The article concludes that many Russians reject new 
phenomena, while support for the censorship of political criticism is not as high, but 
political censorship seems to enjoy more support among elites than among the common 
people.   
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Public support for democratic values has been seen as an important part of the democratization 
process. If people tend to see democracy and democratic institutions in a negative light, they may 
easily support authoritarian movements which may turn back the democratization process. 
Freedom of speech and the press belong to the most important institutions of a democracy, and in 
order to survive they need popular support. Since an independent media did not exist in the 
Soviet Union, these freedoms have been weak and their development has been slow. In the 1990s 
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many journalists and media ended up with paid-articles which destroyed public trust in the 
media, and few protested when the state silenced critical television channels after 2000. If people 
do not see the value of a pluralist, uncensored media they may easily support, or approve, 
government policies which limit the freedom of speech.   
The concept of an ―authoritarian personality‖ was launched in the 1950s (Adorno, Frenkl-
Brunswik, Levinson & Sanford, 1950) and since then both right-wing and left-wing authoritarian 
individuals have been seen as a threat to democratic regimes, and even though criticism has been 
directed at this concept and the authoritarian personality has been seen to be in decline in post-
modern societies, the links between individual beliefs and political outcomes have been widely 
studied. Former studies in post-Soviet Russia have been found that ―authoritarianism strongly 
predicted support for reactionary leaders and military actions and opposition to democratic and non-
Russian leaders and to democratic activities‖ (McFarland, Ageyev & Abalakina-Paap, 1992, p. 
1004). 
In this article we pay attention to one aspect of authoritarian political thinking, namely, the 
support for censorship, and analyse how support for censorship is structured in Russia and what 
kind of materials post-Soviet Russians would like to censor and why. It is worth noticing that 
attitudes to censorship have been widely studied in the United States (see Lambe, 2002, for a 
comprehensive review), while this kind of research has been very limited, if it has been conducted 
at all, in other countries, especially in Western Europe. Therefore, this study about Russia will also 
offer opportunities for international comparisons. 
Censorship in Czarist Russia and in the Soviet Union 
In the Czarist era, censorship was inseparable from the political background of the society and was 
actively cultivated by the monarchy. The political will of the tsar was always considered 
indisputable by most people, and therefore the proclaimed ―rules of the game‖ seem to have been a 
strong priority for the nation. Censorship was consistently promoted by czars without the agreement 
of political bodies. The first Russian newspaper, Vedomosti, was founded by Peter the Great in 1702 
and was personally edited by him for over two decades. In fact, Vedomosti was not a specific kind 
of a publication and resembled more a PR instrument than a newspaper as traditionally understood 
in the West.  
Although historical sources indicate great changes were underway with regard to censorship 
in the early twentieth century compared to previous centuries, this, in fact, concerned mostly 
political plurality, not the printed word. True, there existed a larger variety of newspapers at that 
time, but any publication critical of the political system was unwelcome. With some exceptions, the 
Bolshevik press was undermined for most of the early twentieth century, until Lenin and his 
comrades came to power in 1917.  
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The Soviet period inherited many political traditions from the preceding society. One of these 
legacies was undoubtedly the existence and enforcement of censorship.  
As early as December 1918, the Revolutionary Military Council of the Russian republic 
enacted the Statute of Military Censorship. In June 1922, a new body inherited all censoring 
authorities: Glavlit (Glavnoe upravlenie po delam literatury i izdatelstv — The Main 
Administration for Literary and Publishing Affairs). Glavlit censored all printed materials, 
photographic materials, and books. From the very beginning, Glavlit possessed vast powers. It was 
authorized to conduct a preliminary surveillance of all works destined for publication and 
distribution, including the press.  
Some stages of Soviet history, the so-called ―thaws‖ which only lasted for relatively short 
periods of time such as New Economic Policy under Lenin or Khrushchev‘s denunciation of the 
Stalin‘s legacy, demonstrated a different attitude to censorship. Nonetheless, these ―thaws‖ did little 
to change the ideological principles underlying the state‘s existence. In Soviet society, formal 
censorship developed alongside political control (party supervision of the media) and pre-
censorship by editors (Dzirkals, 1982). Censors were interested not only in repressing heretical 
opinions, but also in dictating what must be written (Dewhirst & Farrell, 1973, p. 12).  
The Post-Soviet era: new trends? 
In the Soviet media law of 1990, formal censorship was banned even though the reality was 
different. There were many rules that allowed these proclaimed rules to be broken by claiming 
political necessity. The ―inadmissibility of censorship‖ is also declared in the contemporary Russian 
media law, which was adopted in 1991 and maintains its initial traits without great changes. 
Censorship itself is defined as ―the demand made by officials, state organs, organizations, 
institutions or public associations that the editor‘s office of a mass medium shall get in advance 
agreement on a message and materials (...) and also for the suppression of the dissemination of 
messages and materials‖ (Russian Mass Media Law, 1991). This definition extends the range of 
censorship beyond state organs. Even though formal censorship was apparently removed in post-
Soviet Russia, editorial freedom was limited, and therefore most Russian journalists continued to 
engage in self-censorship (Belin, 2001, p. 341). By self-censorship we mean, to a large extent, self-
limitation, that is when an author involved in different sorts of creativity has to restrain or even stop 
himself/herself from developing a certain idea. Self-censorship usually appears as a very specific 
skill in camouflaging one‘s thoughts in response to political, economic, and cultural circumstances. 
Moreover, new forms of limitations have been developed concerning the ban to spread state, 
military, or commercial secrets (Zhirkov, 2001, p. 349-350). Under Putin‘s presidency, state 
supervision of the most important media, especially television, has been tightened (Belin, 2002, p. 
154). The state itself and its structures became pivotal censors of the content of the two main 
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Russian TV-channels (First channel and Rossiia) of the state‘s interests. Non-criticism of state 
policy, initiated and developed by Russian Presidents Vladimir Putin at first and then Dmitry 
Medvedev, was and is strictly favored by these two TV-channels, and all other scenarios are 
unwelcome. 
Aleksei Simonov, the Chief of the Russian Glasnost Defense Foundation, identifies six types 
of censorship: administrative censorship, economic censorship, censorship resulting from actions 
by, or threats from, criminals, censorship resulting from editorial policy, censorship resulting from 
editorial taste, and self-censorship (Dewhirst, 2002, p. 28-30). If tighter criteria are used, only the 
first of these remarks can be defined as censorship. The challenge for researchers in the Russian 
case is that the concept ‗censorship‘ may be used in a much wider context than is usually the case in 
the West. 
Many opinion polls conducted in Russia over the last few years have demonstrated a high 
level of support for censorship and media control among the Russian population. The most recent 
polls conducted by ROMIR Monitoring and the All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center 
(WCIOM) in the spring of 2004 and 2006 have shown that 62-63% of Russians (WCIOM, 
6.7.2004; VCIOM, 04.08.2006) and 40% of Russian journalists (Zhurnalisty o Rossii, obshchestve i 
SMI, 2004, p. 11) support censorship in the mass media. To be sure, the ROMIR survey notes that a 
third of respondents viewed censorship as necessarily justified (obyazatel’no nuzhna), while 39% 
were feeling that it is more likely to be justified (skoree nuzhna). Only 9% of respondents 
considered censorship unjustified (neopravdannaya), while 18% reported that censorship is 
unjustified only to some extent. According to WCIOM, 35% of those interviewed thought 
censorship absolutely necessary (bezuslovno nuzhna), while 28% considered censorship justified to 
some extent (2004; 2006).  
In other polls conducted by the Public Opinion Foundation, support for censorship was lower 
(between 49% and 57%) than that in the polls by ROMIR and WCIOM, but the majority of 
Russians supported the idea of censorship. The topics that Russians usually consider necessary to be 
censored include not only politics, but also sex, pornography, violence, crimes, and, perhaps 
surprisingly, advertising. Some respondents added to these topics art forms, entertainment, and 
feature films (Monitoring obshchestvennogo mneniya, 2004, p. 93-94).  
Research material, methods, and results 
To determine why and to what extent Russians today are inclined to support censorship, a question 
on censorship was included in a survey of the Russian population commissioned by a group of 
Finnish researchers (Nikula & Chernysh, 2010). 
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Table 1  
Opinion about Banning Various Types of Information 
 Banned Released with 
limitations 
Circulated 
freely 
Hard to say 
Criticism of the President of Russia 11.4% 37.9% 37.2% 13.4% 
Materials against an ethnic group or race 52.6% 30.0% 7.6% 9.7% 
Materials glorifying communism 31.6% 33.0% 17.3% 18.1% 
Negative information, ―the dark side of reality‖ 66.9% 23.5% 3.5% 6.0% 
Information on sexual minorities, homosexuals 61.5% 28.7% 3.8% 5.9% 
Materials on sects, non-traditional religions 51.6% 34.7% 7.1% 6.5% 
Depiction of violent scenes 77.8% 17.2% 1.8% 3.2% 
Openly erotic materials, naked bodies 54.8% 36.4% 4.2% 4.6% 
Religious propaganda 25.0% 43.7% 18.8% 12.5% 
Advertisements 36.7% 53.7% 3.9% 5.7% 
 
 
The Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences carried out the survey in 
February 2007 in 52 locations in Russia under the supervision of Mikhail Chernysh. The data were 
collected by geographical cluster sampling. The locations in which the interviews took place ranged 
from Moscow to small villages in the Far East as well as to non-Russian republics. The total 
number of respondents was 2,014.  
The question on censorship was divided into ten different categories, partly on the basis of 
earlier research and opinion polls, partly on the basis of researchers‘ decision. Even if the list of the 
topics suggested is far from complete, it nevertheless offers an opportunity to analyse support for 
censorship in detail. The support for censorship for each content category was measured on a three-
point scale. These are 1) information should be banned; 2) information should be published with 
limitations, and 3) information should be freely disseminated. Between 3% and 18% of the 
respondents chose the fourth option, ―hard to say‖. The lowest figure for those having no opinion 
occurred with regard to the censorship of violence, and the highest, regarding materials glorifying 
communism. The last category was included in order to find out if there were people who would 
like to ban the praising of the former regime, but are liberals concerning other topics. 
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Table 2 
 Five Groups of Censorship Supporters 
 Liberals Supporters of 
partial censorship 
Supporters of censorship 
of religious materials 
Supporters of 
political censorship 
Supporters of hard-
line censorship 
% of total 6% 25% 22% 19% 28% 
Men 61% 57% 47% 40% 43% 
Living in big 
cities  
40% 22% 20% 20% 12% 
Under 30 
years of age 
35% 33% 19% 10% 17% 
Low income 15% 15% 22% 24% 21% 
High 
education 
32% 28% 21% 20% 18% 
 
 
In general, support for censorship was high (Table 1): the average figures for the ten issues 
were 47% for total censorship, 34% for partial limitation, and only 11% for free dissemination. On 
the other hand, the topics were selected so that they would have yielded significant support for 
censorship. 
The results indicate that censorship of political topics, represented in this study with the 
banning of criticism of the Russian President, is rather unpopular in Russia. Only a few people 
favor a total ban; the rest of the respondents were divided almost equally between those supporting 
free dissemination and those supporting partial limitations. On the other hand, the majority would 
like to suppress other topics, including those not occurring in the Soviet media, such as nudity, 
information on sexual minorities and on new religious movements.  
Cluster analysis reveals that Russians could be divided into five different groups according to 
their support for censorship (Table 2). Initially, a small group of liberally-minded people emerges 
who almost completely oppose censorship. On the opposite side of the spectrum is a rather large 
group supporting extensive censorship. Quite close to the liberals is a third group consisting of 
―middle-way‖ people who hold neither strictly pro-censorship nor strictly anti-censorship views, but 
would impose limitations on some specific cases. In addition, two groups are usually pro-censorship 
but along stricter lines, firstly, with regard to religious materials and, secondly, with regard to 
political materials.  
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The first, most liberal, group comprises only 6% of Russians. They oppose most forms of 
censorship and would at most like to censor only explicit scenes of violence, advertisements and 
nudity. They are mainly men, often younger than 30 years of age and live mainly in Moscow and 
some other major cities.  
The second group is comprised of people choosing the middle option of selective control. The 
majority of this group supports only a ban on the portrayal of violence. The third and fourth groups 
differ from the others with regard to certain materials. The supporters of censorship of religious 
materials would like to limit religious propaganda and information about new religious movements, 
but would have allowed criticism of the Russian President and materials glorifying communism. 
Another group supporting selective censorship comprises supporters of political censorship; they 
would not seek to limit religious propaganda, but would like to limit criticism of the Russian 
President and materials glorifying communism. The supporters of censorship of religious materials 
are also younger than the supporters of political censorship; old women especially prefer political 
censorship to censorship of religious materials. 
The supporters of hard-line censorship would like to ban most topics from being published. 
Only criticism of the Russian President and advertisements are not unanimously supported. Hard-
line censorship is the most common type among women over 30 and men over 60 years old. This 
finding is well in line with former studies on values in Russia. Ellen Garnaghan, for example, has 
learned that Russians ―who were more willing to give up freedom often thought they had very little 
freedom to start with‖ (Garnaghan, 2007, p. 180). Remarkable differences on the basis of age were 
found by Mishler and Rose (2007), who came to the conclusion that such differences were caused 
by socialization under different social conditions. 
The more liberal groups include those people who are better educated, younger and who have 
higher incomes. The liberals and supporters of partial censorship are also the groups with a majority 
of men. The supporters of hard-line censorship can mostly be found in rural areas and in towns with 
a population of less than one million inhabitants.  
Different categories of censorship correlated positively with each other. The highest 
correlation (.50) could be found between the censorship of information on sexual minorities and the 
censorship of materials about non-traditional religions. The weakest correlation (.065) occurred 
between censorship of advertisements and the censorship of criticism of the Russian president. 
Also, correlations between the censorship of religious propaganda and of ethnic hatred were low. 
Support for a censorship of religious propaganda seems to have different roots than do other types 
of censorship.  
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Table 3  
Factor Analysis of Support for Censorship 
Topic Factor 1.  
Moral 
censorship 
Factor 2. 
Political 
censorship 
Factor 3.  
Censorship of 
religious materials 
Information on sexual minorities .76   
Explicit scenes of violence .76   
Undisguised erotic, naked bodies .70   
Negative information .67 .35  
Materials on sects and non-traditional 
religions 
.56  .42 
Criticism of the Russian President  .69  
Materials glorifying communism  .68 .37 
Materials against an ethnic group or race .46 .56  
Religious propaganda   .81 
Advertisements .30  .50 
Of total variance explained 32.5% 11.8% 10.6% 
Varimax rotation with Kaiser normalization. Values below 0.30 have been omitted. 
 
Elements of censorship  
The factor analysis suggests three different dimensions of censorship; for further analysis the 
ten topics of censorship were reduced to three factors, of which the components appear in Table 3.  
The first of these factors most clearly includes topics such as information on sexual 
minorities, explicit scenes of violence, and erotic materials. These clearly reflect the moral nature of 
censorship. The second factor comprises mainly censorship of criticism of the Russian President, of 
materials glorifying communism, and of materials against an ethnic group. This factor represents 
the political nature of censorship. 
The third factor is represented most clearly by religious propaganda, followed by the 
censorship of advertisements. Also, materials on sects and non-traditional religions as well as 
materials glorifying communism receive a rather high loading on this factor. Therefore, this element 
of censorship may not reflect anti-religious and anti-capitalist Soviet thinking, but rather a more 
modern anti-religious and anti-market thinking.  
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As studies in the United States have found (Lambe, 2004), censorship of pornography and 
censorship of hate speech are two different elements of censorship. In Russia, however, this 
distinction is not as clear as in the United States, since censorship of materials against an ethnic 
group or race is also partly represented in the moral censorship factor. 
The background variables affecting the support for each of these types of censorship, differ 
somewhat, and in some cases, are even opposite. 
As Table 4 shows, the three types of censorship are based partly on different background 
variables. The three trust variables in the table have been counted with factor analysis on the basis 
of trust in 15 different institutions. In addition, identity variables have been counted with factor 
analysis by factoring a group of statements on identity with which the respondents could agree or 
disagree. 
In addition to background variables, media use and media-related attitudes also have an 
impact on support for censorship. Actually, most of these media-use habits reflect support for 
censorship mostly on the basis of the different media use habits of different age or other groups. 
Therefore, reading Cosmopolitan or watching MTV may have no direct links to decreased support 
for censorship, but rather such media are targeted at young people, who generally support 
censorship of moral issues less than older people, who seldom read Cosmopolitan or watch MTV.  
On the other hand, these media-use habits may be connected to censorship attitudes. For 
example, it seems reasonable that people who read Cosmopolitan and watch entertainment TV 
channels STS and TNT may oppose moral censorship more than others, even though one must note 
that such media use habits have less influence than age. The causality may even work in the 
opposite direction: supporters of moral censorship may be less likely to read Cosmopolitan or to 
watch entertainment TV according to their attitudes to censorship. When correlations are counted 
separately for each age group, reading Cosmopolitan and watching STS appear to bear a significant 
relationship to support for moral censorship only among people aged 40 to 49. The correlations 
concerning the groups of different ages are positive, but statistically insignificant.  
The results suggest that media-use habits are based on age, which also explains both the 
attitude towards moral censorship and media use. The impact of a particular type of media use on 
censorship attitudes appears only in some population groups. 
Moral censorship 
The most important predictor for moral censorship is age. The young support moral 
censorship less than older people. The clearest difference is in the willingness of the latter to 
support censorship of erotic materials: support for censorship decreases almost exactly 10 
percentage points per ten years of age (see table 6). Willingness to support censorship of violence 
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Table 4 
Significant Correlations between Background Variables and Different Types of Censorship 
Background variable Moral 
censorship 
Political 
censorship 
Censorship of 
religious materials 
Age  .33** -.06* -.08** 
Gender (male) -.15** -.06** .08** 
Type of settlement (1 = Moscow, 9 = small 
village) 
.14** .13**  
Education -.11**  -.06* 
Has children .23**  -.05* 
Family size (living together)   -.06* 
Respondent‘s family income -.14**   
Self-perceived level of well-being -.15** .06*  
Change in well-being since 2000 -.10** .09**  
Economic optimism -.12** .09**  
Increase in spending for medical services .15** -.12**  
Increase in spending for food .13** -.06*  
Increase in spending for municipal 
payments 
.12** -.07*  
Position in managerial hierarchy  .08*  -.10** 
Speaks a foreign language -.13**  -.07** 
Trusts state institutions  .10**  
Trusts civil society (including the media) -.14** .12**  
Trusts army and church .14**  -.16** 
Ethnic non-Russian .09**  -.06* 
Identity: regional and ethnic .13**  -.10** 
Identity: world citizen -.14**  .07** 
Identity: USSR  -.08**  
Believes in God .08** .08** -.13** 
Orthodox believer   -.09** 
** = correlation is significant at the 0.01 level;  
* = correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
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Table 5.  
Media Use and Support for Censorship 
Background variable Moral censorship Political censorship Censorship of 
religious materials 
Read newspapers .13**  -.10** 
Read magazines -.07** .07*  
Listen to the radio -.08**   
Watch First channel (state) .11**  -.05* 
Watch Rossiya channel (state) .16**  -.07* 
Watch TNT channel (private) -.12**  .12** 
Watch STS channel (private) -.11**   
Watch MTV channel (private) -.12**   
Watch Kul’tura channel (state) .09**   
Watch Sport TV (state)  -.08**  
Watch Ren-TV (private) -.07**   
Listen to Radio Rossii .11**   
Listen to Evropa Plus -.16**   
Listen to Avtoradio -.08**   
Listen to Radio Shanshon   .08** 
Listen to Radio Dorozhnoe  -.09**  
Listen to Ekho Moskvy -.05*   
Read Komsomol’skaya pravda .06*   
Read Liza  .10**  
Read Cosmopolitan -.11**   
Read Sem dnei  .08** -.05 
Read Zdorov’e  .07*  
Internet connection at home -.14**   
Source of information: newspapers  .05* -.11** 
Source of information: internet -.09**   
Source of information: radio   .06* 
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does not decrease with a similar tendency but it nevertheless demonstrates the lowest rate among 
the youngest. In addition, support for censorship of information on sexual minorities and of 
negative information is lower in younger age groups. In particular, those under 30 differ from all 
others.  
This finding is well in line with generation differences in Russian society, that have been 
found previously. Younger Russians, whose experience of the USSR is more limited, are better 
adapted to the new social conditions. Therefore, they tend to accept new phenomena in society and 
the media better than the older generations, who have lived under completely different conditions. 
Moreover, gender and income are important predictors of support for moral censorship. 
Women and those with low incomes are more willing to support moral censorship. The difference 
between men and women is usually not very great: it is highest for the censorship of erotic material 
(+19%) and of negative information (+12%). People whose families earn less than 7,500 roubles 
monthly are more willing to support moral censorship. 
Those living in rural areas more often support moral censorship as do those with lower 
education. In addition, those who feel their well-being has not improved since 1998 are more 
willing to support moral censorship. 
The impact of trust in social institutions is measured according to three dimensions. Levels of 
trust in 15 institutions were measured on a five point scale, and factor analysis served to reveal three 
dimensions of trust (trust in state institutions; trust in non-state institutions, including the media; 
and trust in the church and the army).  
Trust in traditional institutions of authority (the army and the church) has a positive impact on 
support for moral censorship, but trust in civil society – including the media – has a negative 
impact. Various institutions seem to compete for the place of moral guidance: trust in traditional 
authorities opposes trust in modern institutions. Thus, those who see traditional institutions as more 
important tend to support censorship. Trust in state institutions has no significant impact on support 
for moral censorship. 
In addition, media use has some impact on support for moral censorship. Those who read 
newspapers less often are less willing to support moral censorship, but those who read journals and 
listen to the radio more often are more willing to support moral censorship. The differences caused 
by media use actually result from different media-use habits among people of different ages. When 
the influence of age is controlled for, these differences disappear or become insignificant. Having 
an Internet connection at home also decreases one‘s willingness to support moral censorship.  
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Political censorship 
Political censorship combines the censorship of criticism of the Russian President, of praising 
communism, and of hatred against ethnic groups.  
The most important factor behind differences favoring support for political censorship is 
location. Those living in the countryside are more willing to support political censorship than those 
living in Moscow and in towns with 100,000 to one million inhabitants. In this respect, the most 
liberal people can be found in St. Petersburg. 
The impacts of age, income, change in well-being since 2000, and change in consumption are 
opposite to support for moral censorship. Those who are young, have higher incomes, whose well-
being has improved and whose consumption of food and medical services has decreased support 
political censorship more often than others. The impact of age is mostly due to younger Russians‘ 
greater inclination to ban materials glorifying communism. 
Women support political censorship more than men. The gender difference is greatest in 
support of a ban on materials against an ethnic group or race (+ 6%), but is almost non-existent in 
the two other main categories of political censorship. 
Income as such does not lead to any differences in support of political censorship, but 
person‘s self-perception of his/her economic situation has a small impact: those who feel that their 
economic situation is better more frequently support political censorship. This is due mainly to the 
fact that those with no economic problems support the censorship of materials glorifying 
communism more than do others and would like to at least limit, if not ban, criticism of the Russian 
President. In addition, those at the lower end of the economic scale support political censorship 
more than do middle-class economic groups. 
Position in a managerial hierarchy also has a positive correlation to political censorship. 
About 25% of top-level managers preferred to ban criticism of the Russian President, and as many 
as 48% of managers supported a ban on materials glorifying communism.  
Believers in God are also more prone to support political censorship. People who identify 
themselves as citizens of the USSR are less willing to support political censorship, mainly because 
they support censorship of materials glorifying communism less than others. People who identity 
themselves as citizens of the USSR are usually older, more often live in the rural areas and have a 
lower level of education.  
The most important difference for moral censorship is its impact on trust in civil society. 
Trust in almost any institution, including the media, increases support for political censorship. In 
particular, trust in media and in civil society institutions (trade unions, civic organizations) and in 
political institutions increases in terms of a certain desire to support political censorship. This can 
be explained by the fact that trust in both the President and the media represents support for the 
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status quo and that this trust in state authorities implies trust in granting the right to control media 
content to someone in a superior position.  
Political censorship seems to enjoy more support among elites than among the common 
people. This element of censorship also includes topics such as the censorship of materials 
glorifying communism. It seems reasonable that elites in particular support such censorship. The 
orientation of elites has turned to the opposite but the attitude to alternative views has remained the 
same: before anticommunist materials were not tolerated, now the same attitude is focused on pro-
communist materials. 
Censorship of religious materials 
This dimension of censorship represents a way of thinking which opposes both religious 
propaganda and, strangely, advertising. Both are topics which did not exist in the Soviet media. In 
addition, materials on new religious sects and, perhaps surprisingly, those glorifying communism 
have a certain impact on this element of censorship.  
The clearest indicator for censorship of religious materials was naturally represented by 
religious faith. Of believers, 24% supported censorship of religious propaganda, and 22% would 
like to permit it without limitations, whereas among non-believers, these figures were 29% in favor 
of complete censorship and only 12% in favor of the free dissemination of religious propaganda. It 
may seem strange that many believers support the control of religious propaganda, but they may 
oppose the propaganda of other religions more than that of their own or they may not define 
religious materials primarily as ‗propaganda‘. 
Moreover, a respondent‘s position in a managerial hierarchy affects his or her support for 
religious censorship. Those in higher managerial positions support censorship of religious materials 
more than do others.  
Men support this kind of censorship more than do women and the young support it more than 
the old. Gender and age had completely opposite effects on the censorship of religious propaganda 
and advertisements than on the censorship of other kinds of issues. 
The banning of religious propaganda enjoys support among the younger population, but 
banning of advertisements has more support among people over 60. Among others, support for the 
banning of advertisements is relatively stable. Among people under 30, the attitude towards 
advertisements is the freest: as many as 41% would allow it without restrictions. On the other hand, 
only 12% of people under 30 would like to allow religious propaganda without restrictions.  
Even though education has practically no impact on religiosity, those with a poor educational 
level support censorship of religious materials more actively. Those who do not use newspapers as a 
source of information and do not read newspapers also favor censorship of religious materials.  
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Quite naturally, those who did not trust the Russian Orthodox Church seek to support 
censorship of religious materials. On the other hand, there were no major differences between trust 
in other institutions and censorship of religious materials. 
While a ban on religious propaganda is supported more by non-believers than by orthodox 
believers, support for a ban on information concerning non-traditional religions is bolstered by 
orthodox believers, even though the difference is small. Also, the censorship of advertisements 
enjoys support among orthodox believers more often than among members of other religions and 
non-believers. The finding that a significant number of believers support a ban on religious 
propaganda can be understood as part of a certain formlessness which according to Jeffrey 
Alexander (1997, p. 109-110) has emerged in the post-socialist states. 
Discussion  
The high level of support for censorship, which has also been found in earlier studies, lends 
support to the idea that some elements of a totalitarian or authoritarian mindset still prevail in post-
Soviet Russia. As has been found earlier (Mishler & Willerton, 2003, p. 114-115), the Russian 
public tends to support order and security and expect the state to take responsibility for popular 
well-being. It may well be that Russians also expect the state to take responsibility for decent media 
content and therefore tend to support censorship, even if this means state control of the media. Fear 
and suspicion regarding new things perhaps explain Russian attitudes to censorship even more 
clearly: things which did not exist in Soviet period continue to generate dissatisfaction, especially 
among older people who were socialized during the Soviet era.  
Moreover, according to research conducted on the basis of data collected for the European 
Social Survey, the average Russian is characterized by a high level of cautiousness or even fear, and 
a high need for the protection of a strong government (Magun & Rudnev, 2008, p. 56) 
High levels of cautiousness on the one hand and trust in strong government on the other are 
also related to high levels of support for censorship. Fear of new things contributes to the idea that 
the emergence of new things should be limited, and strong support for social protection from a 
powerful government paves the way to censorship (by the government) as a means of restriction. 
The two main elements of censorship, moral censorship and political censorship, are 
supported by very different, in many cases even opposing, groups of people. Moral censorship is 
supported more often by the elderly, women, people with low education, low social status, and 
people living in rural areas. 
On the other hand, political censorship is supported more often by those who have gained in 
the transition and who are on the upper levels of the managerial hierarchy. This may have 
something to do with the idea that fear of freedom is part of the totalitarian mentality (Mikheyev, 
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1996, p. 34) inherited from the Soviet past. The new elites have been formed partly on the basis of 
the old Soviet elite and have retained part of that old elite‘s mentality. 
The high level of support for censorship, even if censorship itself is based on moral rather 
than political considerations, indicates that institutional learning did not develop as rapidly as 
Mishler and Rose (2007) found on the basis of some other variables. Moreover, when comparative 
data is available it tends to indicate an increase rather than a decrease in support for censorship in 
general. 
The rather strict views on the censorship of most issues are in accordance with the trend 
previously identified in the less advanced countries of Eastern Europe (Russia included) that ―the 
population feels a stronger need for stricter laws, for resisting illegal acts and organized crime,‖ and 
in this case the professionals ―indicate the highest degree of support for respect of the legal and 
institutional order‖ (Tilkidjiev, 2006, p. 124-125). 
Increasing trust in the president and other institutions may even have an impact on support for 
censorship: an increased trust in institutions may also result in increasing trust in censorship 
exercised by these institutions.  
Political censorship seems to be more related to the Soviet past. Political censorship is 
supported more actively by the elites. The old thinking remains, but the direction is the opposite: the 
glorification of communism should be banned, likewise criticism of the Russian President. Political 
censorship, however, is much less prominent than moral censorship, and attitudes towards it are 
much more liberal.  
The fact that Russian elites support political censorship more than ordinary people confirms 
that the elite is not ready for freedom and political competition, as Lilia Shevtsova (2007, p. 295) 
has aptly stated.  
Different types of censorship can be seen to have relationships to different types of totalitarian 
mentality, as Vainshtein (1994, p. 256) has defined them. As some support the former totalitarian 
regime, some are adherents of authoritarian rule aimed at the creation of a market economy, while 
the democratic idea is generally compromised. 
The generation shift may also reduce the support for censorship, but this will more likely 
cause a decline in moral rather than political censorship. Attitudes to some new phenomena have 
become paradoxically both more tolerant and even less tolerant, as is the case with attitudes towards 
religious sects (Levada, 2004).  
On the other hand, it is worth noting that only a minority entirely support free publication of 
materials against ethnic groups even though Russian political culture has some elements of 
intolerance. Russians seem to be realizing dangerous opportunities for xenophobia, which may lead 
to dire consequences, taking into account the historical legacy of the country. Therefore, the many 
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provocative attempts by nationalistic groups to fan the fire of hatred against national minorities are 
being regarded as a negative development by most of the population.  
Conclusion 
This study examined three different types of censorship found in Russia. These elements of 
censorship include moral censorship, political censorship, and the censorship of religious materials.  
Moral censorship combines the censorship of obscenity (violence, nudity) as well as various 
new phenomena including non-traditional religions and advertisements. Moral censorship 
represents fear and rejection of new phenomena and seems to be related to political conservatism, as 
in the United States (Peek & Brown, 1978). In Russia, however, moral censorship seems to be 
linked even more to age, and may therefore decline in the future.  
Censorship of religious materials is a form of censorship that is more frequently found among 
the young than the old and is more common among men than women. This dimension of censorship 
seems to be the most non-traditional element of censorship, which is more supported by people who 
identify themselves as citizens of the world.  
An individual support for censorship correlates with his/her experience of the overall political 
and economic changes in modern Russian society. Many individuals reject new phenomena such as 
pornography, sexual minorities, and non-traditional religions indiscriminately. In this respect, 
Russians support censorship when they become older or if they are poorly educated, live in smaller 
towns or in rural areas, and believe in God. Similar causalities have also been found in American 
support for censorship (Lambe, 2002). 
In fact, Russians support the censorship of many issues mainly for the same reasons as do 
Americans. On the other hand, censorship of criticism of the Russian President, the glorification of 
communism, and of religious propaganda are seen as specific phenomena support for which is not 
directly connected to support for the censorship of other topics.  
The prospects of support for censorship seem to be uncertain and ambiguous: the decline of 
non-conformism can be seen as a positive development, but at the same time there is also a growing 
willingness to condone violence and ethnic hatred. There is not, as could be expected, a negative 
correlation between opposition to censorship of information on sexual minorities on the one hand, 
and opposition to hate speech on the other. This sounds alarming, because with opposition to 
censorship on political issues more acceptable forms of censorship, such as that of violence and of 
hate speech, lose support.  
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